REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

1014 Pennsylvania, Manila
2 December 1947

The Commanding General
Headquarters, PHILRYCOM
APO 707

ATTENTION: CHIEF, GAB G-3

Dear Sir:

In answer to the letter from that Headquarters dated 7 June 1947 signed by Thomas J. Brown CWO, USA, Asst Adjutant General, denying recognition to "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA", I wish to submit this petition for reconsideration outlined on the grounds of the refusal of recognition given in the letter.

A. Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable evidence:-

Guerrilla service, as we understand it is composed of intelligence activity, sabotage, actual clash of arms and propaganda. "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" was active in all these lines of guerrilla work.

1. Intelligence Activity:-

a. "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" is included in the Report of General Willoughby to the Commanding General of the SWPA as to guerrilla groups operating in the Philippines.

b. In a letter of acknowledgment dated 16 December 1943, which is attached as Appendix "A", Col. Wendell W. Fertig, the Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District congratulated the undersigned for a compendium of intelligence information embodied in an intelligence report covering the period from 1 December 1942 to December 1943.

c. General Macario Peralta describes in his affidavit, attached as Appendix "B", the intelligence activities of and nature of intelligence reports submitted by "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" thus:

> "5. That subsequently, after we had established liasson on the system of runners, he sent monthly intelligence reports thru Congressman Esmeraldo Eco of Camarines Norte who travelled between my Headquarters and Manila;
>
> "6. That it was the intelligence reports of the 'ANG MGA MAHARLIKA' which first called the attention to the fact that the Japanese were developing the Mountain Province and the Cagayan areas of northern Luzon into possible defensive positions to which Japanese troops could fall back to should American landings drive the Japanese shore defenses inland;
>
> "7. That it was from the intelligence reports of the 'ANG MGA MAHARLIKA' that it was learned of the Japanese intention to build the

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

Bukod-Pingkian trail extending the mountain trail from Baguio to debauch into the Cagayan Valley, these intelligence reports submitting the conclusion that this would be the escape route of the Japanese troops from the Central Plains of Luzon as well as the Lingayen Area, this conclusion subsequently being proven true when during the liberation YAMASHITA withdrew his troops to Baguio and from there to the Cagayan Valley thru the Bukod-Pingkian Trail;

"8. That it was from the intelligence reports of the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" that the information was obtained to the effect that the Zambales Coast most especially the coast along the town of San Antonio and the Capones Island was left unguarded by the Japanese except for skeleton Kempei Tai units and the conclusion submitted in these reports that the Zambales Coasts especially along San Antonio could be a safe landing point for submarines for the distribution of arms and equipment to guerrillas of Luzon as well as a possible landing point for the liberation forces, which conclusion was proved correct when the American Liberation forces landed in San Antonio Zambales without opposition;

"9. That it was from these reports that the information was obtained of the possibility of landing arms and equipment for guerrillas in the northeastern coast of Tayabas and in the northwestern coast of Ilocos Norte, especially along Bangui, which recommendations were subsequently adopted by GHQ SWPA when in August 1944 a reconnaissance party under Lt. Jose Valera was landed by submarine in Caunayan Bay, Bangui, Ilocos Norte with instructions to contact any of the guerrilla groups listed in the Memorandum given to Lt. Jose Valera in which Memorandum was included the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" under the command of Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos;

"10. That "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" was the only guerrilla unit which submitted a complete and detailed report on the political situation of the Philippines under the advise of President Manuel Roxas and the direction of Honorable Narciso Ramos and Modesto Farolan;

"11. That "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" attached to its intelligence reports accurate and detailed maps of such military enemy installations like the GABU Airfield at Laoag, Ilocos Norte, the Japanese naval supply station at Rro, San Fernando, La Union, the airfield at Lingayen, Pañgasinan, Clark Field, Angeles, Pampanga, Nielson Airfield, Makati, Rizal, Fort McKinley, Rizal and the Manila Bay area, which maps were utilized and adopted by me in the preparation of my consolidated reports to GHQ SWPA;

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

"12. That it was the "ANG MGA MAHARe LIKA' which first called the attention to the enemy intention to dynamite and burn the City of Manila and to massacre the civilian population in the event that the Japanese had to abandon the city or were in danger of losing it to American hands, 'ANG MGA MAHARLIKA' attaching to the intelligence reports a map which located the buildings in which dynamite or gasoline would be planted for the purpose, which report proved accurate during the liberation;

"13. That the 'ANG MGA MAHARLIKA' submitted accurate reports of occurences in Fort Santiago acquired thru its agents who were actually working within this Japanese Kempei Tai Prison;".

d. Major General Rafael Jalandoni, at present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in his original indorsement to the request of recognition of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" stated that thisguerrila unit was one of the original groups of 1942, and in his affidavit, which is attached hereto as Appendix "C" states the existence of intelligence agents of the group all over Luzon.

e. Col. Vicente Umali and Col. Primitivo San Agustin, Jr., the highest ranking officers of the President Quezon's Own Guerrillas and whose affidavits are attached hereto as Appendices "D" and "E", respectively, testify to the intelligence activities including intelligence reports to Col. Wendell W. Fertig through Col. Primitivo San Agustin and the smuggling of the first radio equipment from Mindanao to Luzon in 1943.

f. Major Leopoldo Guillermo, the Signal Officer of the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area under Major Edwin Ramsey, whose affidavit is hereto attached as Appendix "F" personally testifies to the intelligence activities of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" in coordination with the G-2 of the ECLGA.

g. Major Salvador Abcede of the Negros guerrillas whose affidavit is hereto attached as Appendix "G" testifies to the nature of intelligence reports submitted by "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" to Col. Jesus Villamor through Capt. Fernando Castañeda.

h. Lt. Col. Bernard Anderson whose headquarters was located at Tayabas, can testify to the nature of intelligence reports submitted by "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA."

i. Hon. Narciso Ramos, present Minister-Counsellor in the Philippine Embassy at Washington, D.C., USA whose affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix "H" testifies to the nature of the intelligence activities of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA".

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

j. Consul-General Modesto Farolan, whose affidavit is hereto attached as Appendix "I" testifies to intelligence activities of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA".

2. Sabotage:-

a. No guerrilla unit has as yet outdone "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" in its achievement of burning three Japanese war vessels in Manila in July 1944 (See Par. 15 of Gen. Peralta's affidavit, Appendix "B"; Par. 13 of affidavit of Minister Ramos, Appendix "H"; Par. 5, affidavit of Col. Torralba, Appendix "J").

b. Col. Margarito Torralba, Camp Commander of Camp Murphy, whose affidavit is hereto attached as Appendix "J", explains how the Japanese Kempei Tai considered the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" responsible for the loss and destruction of supplies in Japanese Depots at Port Area, Nichols Field, Nielson Field, San Juan and Quezon City.

c. Minister Narciso Ramos (Appendix "H") explains the nature of the sabotage work of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA."

3. Actual clash of arms:-

a. Before the Liberation, the East Pañgasinan unit which aided the Sixth Army and was recognized by it, was maintained in Pañgasinan. As proof of its existence in the field in actual clash of arms with the enemy is the jealousy it stimulated from the officers of Major Lapham, Capt. McKenzie and Capt. Ray Hunt who strenously objected to its presence and operations in Pañgasinan. So much so that orders were issued for the arrest of the officers of the East Pañgasinan unit of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" as well as of the officers of Major Ramseys units in the same area. The order could not be carried out. Capts. Hunt and McKenzie will surely confirm this.

b. The "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" of Manila was attached to the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, during the liberation as shown by the attached photostatic copy of the attachment orders signed by Major R. G. Langman, S-2 officer of the regiment, which photostatic copy is marked Appendix "K".

c. The Ilocos Norte Regiment was actually ambushing Japanese patrols in Ilocos Norte as evidenced by the testimony of the mestizo Japanese interpreter for the Laoag, Ilocos Norte Kempei Tai, Isidro TSUDA, whose affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix "L".

d. The undersigned and trigger squads actually liquidated specially offensive Japanese officers and men in Manila in 1942, 1943 and 1944 (See Affidavits of General Peralta, Appendix "B", General Jalandoni, Appendix "C", Colonel Umali, Appendix "D", Colonel San Agustin, Jr, Appendix "E", Major Guillermo, Appendix "F" and Colonel Torralba, Appendix "J").

e. The undersigned was wounded in the right thigh in a gun fight with Japanese soldiers and under-cover men in 1943.

PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

4. Propaganda:-

a. This was the first and easiest tasks of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" (See affidavits of Consul General Modesto Farolan, Appendix "I", Minister Narciso Ramos, Appendix "H").

b. Refer to Colonel Anderson who received copies of our underground newspaper.

B. The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition to the enemy:-

1. Notwithstanding orders received from the Commanding General, SWPA, through General Macario Peralta not to start open hostilities which might encourage retaliatory measures by the Japanese against the Filipino civilian population, "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" maintained offensive units in Manila, Pañgasinan and Ilocos Norte, actually engated in trading bullets with the enemy, destroying his equipment and cowering his movements.

2. Please see discussion of No. A-2 and 3, Sabotage and Actual Clash of Arms in pages 4.

C. Actigities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual defeat of the enemy:-

1. If the destruction of enemy lines, equipment, supplies and the submission of vital information to the Commanding General, SWPA materially contributed to the eventual defeat of the enemy as regards other guerrilla groups, then it should be so also with the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA."

D. A definite organization was not established:-

1. The history of this guerrilla group explains the existence of such definite organization.

E. Adequate records were not maintained (names, ranks, dates of enlistment or joining, dates of promotions, and necessary related information):-

1. Records were kept but upon specific orders issued by the undersigned, they were destroyed in the middle of 1944 to prevent the leaking of our secrets. The intensive hunt for the leaders and members of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" prompted this move.

2. Attached hereto as Appendix "M" are all the records of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" or copies of such as are in existence.

3. It should be unfair to be too exacting on this point. Secrecy was the sign of the true guerrilla. Any group of men who have an abundance of records are not true guerrillas.

F. Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its leaders because of the desertion of its commanding officer to join another unit:-

1. The Commanding Officer did not desert his unit nor did he join any other unit.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

2. The Commanding Officer of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" left East Pañgasinan in 8 December 1944 towards the 14th Infantry Area AUS in Mountain Province, on a mission by President Manuel Roxas on air-reception bases and airfields. He was cut-off from a return to Pañgasinan by the withdrawal of the Japanese to the Cagayan Valley along the route he followed.

3. Attached hereto as Appendix "N" is a letter of Lt. Col. Romulo A. Manriquez, AUS, Commanding Officer of the 14th Infantry, AUS, dated 16 January 1945, addressed to Col. Russell Volckmann at a time when the question of my supposed desertion had not yet loomed large in the issue of recognition.

4. Please see also affidavit of Hon. Narciso Ramos, Appendix "H", which explains the supposed desertion.

5. I repeatedly requested release from my attachment to the USAFIP NL but such requests were repeatedly turned down. Attached are the papers on one such request marked as Appendix "O".

6. All the respective Commanding Officers, Major Pacifico E. Marcos in Manila, Major Narciso Ramos in East Pañgasinan and Major Simeon M. Valdez in Ilocos Norte were all competent and able leaders and we had formulated plans of action for any eventuality before I left on my mission for President Roxas. As proof of their competency, Major Valdez with only one battalion, most if not all of whom came from "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" liberated Ilocos Norte province the first province to be liberated in Northern Luzon, and without the aid of any American troops. Major Ramos' unit in East Pañgasinan helped in the Villa Verde and Cagayan campaigns being considered, in the official reports of the Sixth Army, the best guerrilla unit attached to the 25th and 32nd Divisions of the Sixth Army. Major Pacifico Marcos was seriously wounded in the fighting in Manila when the Manila unit was attached to the Fifth Cavalry, AUS. The medical certificate about Major Pacifico Marcos' wounds is hereto attached as Appendix "P".

7. Irrespective of the shortcomings, if any, of the undersigned Commanding Officer of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA", the different units of this guerrilla group have shown their right to recognition. The men should not be penalized for the actions of the undersigned should such actions be considered questionable. He is willing to assume all the blame arising from such questioned actuations.

G. Sphere of operations and unit strength claimed by the unit were not commensurate with the nature of the terrain, limitation of communication facilities, and the degree of anti-resistance activities of the Japanese in the area during the period concerned:-

1. Broken down to actual figures the number of those for whom recognition is sought is:

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

	Officers	EM	Total
Headquarters, Manila ------	39	144	183
Ilocos Norte Regiment -----	75	985	1060
GRAND TOTAL ----			1243

2. The more than 1,000 men who composed the Ilocos Norte Regiment later constituted the bulk of the 15th Infantry Regiment, USAFIP, NL, which actually fought during the North Luzon operations and is credited with the liberation of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur and Abra, and with the reduction of the defenses set up by General ARAKI in the Tañgadan sector, as well as those set up by YAMASHITA's men in the Bessang Pass Sector, in conjunction with other units of the USAFIP, NL.

3. These successes of the 15th Infantry in Northern Luzon prove the wisdom and foresight of the plan to establish in Ilocos Norte as early as 1943, the Ilocos Norte Regiment of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA".

4. While these original members of the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" who were ordered by the undersigned to join the 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, to avoid any violent and bloody clashes between guerrilla groups, most specially since the 15th Infantry and the 121st Infantry also of USAFIP, NL, wereled by American officers, were recognized with the 15th Infantry, such recognition dates only as of November, 1944. These men had been actively engaged in guerrilla work since April 1943. Their recognition as members of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" From April, 1943 up to November, 1944 would give them justice.

5. The action of the undersigned Commanding officer in avoiding internicine warfare between guerrilla groups and working for a unified command of Northern Luzon under Colonel VOLCKMANN should not be held to prejudice the men of the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" so as to nullify and disregard the actual guerrilla service of these men of the MAHARLIKA before the unification with the 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NL, on November, 1944. Rather it should be rewarded.

6. The men of the MANILA UNIT of a little more than a hundred in number, certainly cannot be considered in excess of personnel required for the achievements already related. And as final proof of this, Major Langham, S-2 Officer of the Fifth Cavalry, attached all of them to his unit. Surely this would never have been done if the unit was over-burdened with excess personnel.

H. Unit did not show any satisfactory continuity of activity and organization-

1. Activity of all units never stopped.

2. As outlined in graph-form, here were the activities of the two units now seeking recognitionÑ

a. Manila Unit-

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078



b. Ilocos Norte Regiment:-



3. War has been said to be a widely separated series of violent and exhausting momemts interspaced by doldrums of conjecture and waiting. This is also true of guerrilla warfare. It was true of the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA."

I. Frequent change of geographic location was not justified:-

1. The headquarters and troops of the different units never changed location.

2. There were frequent changes of the headquarters in Manila. The frequent raids by the Japanese Kempei Tai dictated these movements. But the headquarters was always in Manila proper.

3. The leaders, specially the undersigned Commanding Officer, found security only in movement. His fame, or notoriety, even before the war, rendered him an easy object of detection. If he stayed long in any one place, a search of the locality by Japanese usually followed.

J. Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation and family obligations:-

1. Some **(not all)** members wre engaged in normal civilian occupation and family obligations, but these members were, even while so occupied, devoting their entire effort to military activities.

2. This was true in the City of Manila and in the towns where the intelligence agents agents as well as those assigned to gather arms, supplies and funds, had to move and live practically under the noses of the Japanese.

3. Apparently normal pursuits were a necessity to insure success and security for almost all the men of the Manila unit. The City of Manila had been divided into neighborhood associations by the Japanese, and each neighborhood association was ordered under threat of heavy penalty, to keep a complete list of all persons living within the boundaries of each neighborhood association. The lack of normal civilian occupation would have been easily detected

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

by the Japanese and their spies and immediately investigated.

4. For the members of the Manila unit, the City of Manila with its closely-packed homes and neighborhood associations was the field of operations, whether of combat, sabotage, intelligence, or propaganda. That they should have taken the most elementary measures for preservation and security should not be held against them but should be considered proof of their capacity for guerrilla work.

5. Most if not all of the members of the Ilocos Norte Regiment were concentrated in the small barrios in the outlying towns where they underwent military training and lived the military routine. The ambuscades of Japanese patrols in these outlying barrios as testified to by the Japanese mestizo Isidro TSUDA (Appendix "L") is proof of this.

K. Many members apparently lived at home, supporting their families by means of farming or other civilian pursuits, and assisted the guerrilla unit on a part time basis only:-

1. This subject is related to the immediately preceding subject.

2. It is reiterated that any member of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" even while apparently engaged in normal civilian pursuits, was still performing his military duties while so occupied.

3. The only sources of funds of this guerrilla group were the contributions of sympathizers, the earnings of "The Ex-Service Men's Company" (which Major Guillermo, the Signal Officer of the Ramsey guerrillas has explained, was organized to support the MAHARLIKA, Appendix "F") captured funds and contributions of the members.

4. In the City of Manila, the undersigned, at one time, kept his headquarters at his home with his family --- a strategy which may have been ill-advised but surely not inconvenient.

5. In the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA", the members did not support their families. The families supported the members.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully requested that the **order denying recognition** to the MANILA and ILOCOS NORTE Units of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" **be reconsidered and reversed**, and **recognition be granted** to the MANILA unit as of **1 December 1942** and to the **ILOCOS NORTE REGIMENT** as of **1 April 1943**.

Respectfully,

Incls: Appendices "A" to "P".

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding Officer

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND883078

INDEX TO APPENDICES ATTACHED TO REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

Appendix No.	Subject Matter
"A"	Letter of acknowledgment dated December 16, 1943 signed by Col. Wendell W. FERTIG, C.O. 10th MD.
"B"	Affidavit of Brigadier General Macario PERALTA,Jr. Commanding Officer of the Panay Guerrillas.
"C"	Affidavit of Major General Rafael JALANDONI, AFP CofS.
"D"	Affidavit of Colonel Vicente UMALI of the PQOG.
"E"	Affidavit of Colonel Primitivo SAN AGUSTIN, Jr. of PQOG.
"F"	Affidavit of Major Leopoldo GUILLERMO, Signal Officer of ECLGA.
"G"	Affidavit of Major Salvador ABCEDE of the Negros Guerrillas.
"H"	Affidavit of Minister-Counsellor Narciso RAMOS of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C.
"I"	Affidavit of Consul-General Modesto FAROLAN of the Philippine Consulate at Hawaii.
"J"	Affidavit of Colonel Margarito TORRALBA, AFP.
"K"	Photostatic copy of Certificate of attachment of the "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" Manila Unit to the Fifth Cavalry Regiment during the liberation signed by Major R. G. Langham, S-2.
"L"	Affidavit of mestizo Japanese interpreter of the Laoag, Ilocos Norte KEMPEI TAI, Isidro TSUDA.
"M"	Records of "ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" or copies of such as are in existence.
"N"	Letter of Lt. Col. Romulo A. MANRIQUEZ, AUS, Commanding Officer, 14th Infantry, AUS, dated 16 January 1945 re supposed desertion of Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos.
"O"	Papers on one of the requests of Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. MARCOS for release from attachment to USAFIP NL, but which were repeatedly turned down.
"P"	Medical Certificate about Major Pacifico Marcos' wounds.